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Abstract. This paper derives conditions under which preferences and technology are
nonparametrically identified in hedonic equilibrium models, where products are differenti-
ated along more than one dimension and agents are characterized by several dimensions of
unobserved heterogeneity. With products differentiated along a quality index and agents
characterized by scalar unobserved heterogeneity, single crossing conditions on preferences
and technology provide identifying restrictions. We develop similar shape restrictions in
the multi-attribute case. These shape restrictions, which are based on optimal transport
theory and generalized convexity, allow us to identify preferences for goods differentiated
along multiple dimensions, from the observation of a single market. We thereby extend
identification results in Matzkin (2003) and Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim (2010) to
accommodate multiple dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity. One of our results is a
proof of absolute continuity of the distribution of endogenously traded qualities, which is
of independent interest.
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1. Introduction
Recent years have seen renewed interest in hedonic models, particularly their identifica-
tion and estimation. Hedonic models were initially introduced to analyze price responses
to quality parameters of differentiated goods. They allow to answer such questions as: (1)
Given the fact that the amenities offered by cars constantly evolve over time, how can one
construct a price index measuring the evolution of car prices and deflating improvements
in amenities? (2) How can one explain price differentiation in wine, art, luxury goods, pro-
fessional sports wages? (3) What does the correlation between the wage differentials and
the level of risk associated to a given job reveal about individuals’ valuation for their own
life? (4) How can one analyze individual preferences for environmental features?
These questions gave rise to a vast literature, which aims at modeling implicit markets
for quality differentiated products. There are two layers to this literature. The first layer
is the literature on “hedonic regressions,” i.e., regressions of prices against good attributes,
with corrections for the standard endogeneity issue that consumers with greater taste for
quality will consume more of it. The second layer has broader scope: the literature on
“hedonic equilibrium models” incorporates a supply side with differentiated productivity
over various quality parameters and studies the resulting equilibrium. This approach dates
back at least as far as Tinbergen (1956); and Rosen (1974) provides a famous two-step pro-
cedure to estimate general hedonic models and thereby analyze general equilibrium effects
of changes in buyer-seller compositions, preferences and technology on qualities traded at
equilibrium and their price. Following the influential criticism of Rosen’s strategy in Brown
and Rosen (1982) and the invalidity of supply side observable characteristics as instruments
in structural demand estimation as discussed in Epple (1987) and Bartik (1987), it was gen-
erally believed that identification in hedonic equilibrium models required data from multiple
markets, as in Epple (1987), Kahn and Lang (1988) and, more recently, Bajari and Benkard
(2005) and Bishop and Timmins (2011).
Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004) show, however, that hedonic equilibrium models
are in fact identified from single market data, under separability assumptions, as in Eke-
land, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004), or shape restrictions, as in Heckman, Matzkin, and
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Nesheim (2010). The common underlying framework is that of a perfectly competitive mar-
ket with heterogeneous buyers and sellers and traded product quality bundles and prices
that arise endogeneously in equilibrium. Preferences are quasi-linear in price and under
mild semicontinuity assumptions, Ekeland (2010) and Chiappori, McCann, and Nesheim
(2010) show that equilibria exist, in the form of a joint distribution of product and con-
sumer types (who consumes what), a joint distribution of product and producer types (who
produces what) and a price schedule such that markets clear for each endogenously traded
product type. Equilibrium existence results are valid in hedonic markets for multi-attribute
products, but existing single market identification strategies restrict attention to a single
quality dimension and scalar unobserved heterogeneity in consumer preferences and pro-
duction technology. Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004) require marginal utility (resp.
marginal product) to be additively separable in unobserved consumer (resp. producer) char-
acteristic. Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim (2010) show that demand is nonparametrically
identified under a single crossing condition and that various additional shape restrictions
allow identification of preferences without additive separability.
The objective of these papers, which is also ours, is to recover structural preference and
technology parameters from the observation of who trades what and at what price. In
the identification exercise, price is assumed known, as are the distributions characterizing
who produces and consumes which good. Since price is observed and the environment
is perfectly competitive, identification of preferences and identification of technology can
be treated independently and symmetrically. Take the consumer problem, for instance.
Under a single crossing condition on the utility function (also known as Spence-Mirlees in
the mechanism design literature), the first order condition of the consumer problem yields
an increasing demand function, i.e., quality demanded by the consumer as an increasing
function of her unobserved type, interpreted as unobserved taste for quality. Assortative
matching guarantees uniqueness of demand, as the unique increasing function that maps the
distribution of unobserved taste for quality, which is specified a priori, and the distribution
of qualities, which is observed. Hence demand is identified as a quantile function, as in
Matzkin (2003). Identification, therefore, is driven by a shape restriction on the utility
function.
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We show that similar shape restrictions on the utility function also yield identification
conditions in the case of non scalar characteristics and unobserved heterogeneity. In the
special case where marginal utility is additively separable in the unobservable taste vector,
concavity yields nonparametric identification of the utility function, according to the cele-
brated Brenier Theorem of optimal transport theory (Theorem 8 in Appendix 6.1). More
generally, a generalization of the single crossing condition known as the Twist Condition in
optimal transport theory and a generalized convexity shape restriction yield identification
of the utility function in hedonic equilibrium models with multiple quality dimensions. The
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is fully specified a priori and cannot be identified
from single market data without additional separability conditions or exclusion restrictions.
An important result we prove on hedonic equilibrium is a set of mild conditions on the
primitives under which the endogenous distribution of qualities traded at equilibrium is ab-
solutely continuous. The proof of absolute continuity of the distribution of qualities traded
at equilibrium is based on an argument from Figalli and Juillet (2008), also applied in Kim
and Pass (2014).
Related work. Beyond Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004), Heckman, Matzkin, and
Nesheim (2010) and other contributions cited so far, this paper is closely related to the
growing literature on identification and estimation of nonlinear econometric models with
multivariate unobserved heterogeneity on the one hand, and to the empirical literature
on matching models where agents match along multiple dimensions on the other hand.
The quantile identification strategy of Matzkin (2003) was recently extended to non scalar
unobserved heterogeneity using the Rosenblatt (1952)-Knothe (1957) sequential multivari-
ate quantile transform for nonlinear simultaneous equations models in Matzkin (2013) and
bivariate hedonic models in Nesheim (2013). Chiappori, McCann, and Nesheim (2010)
derive a matching formulation of hedonic models and thereby highlight the close relation
between empirical strategies in matching markets and in hedonic markets. Galichon and
Salanie´ (2012) extend the work of Choo and Siow (2006) and identify preferences in mar-
riage markets, where agents match on discrete characteristics, as the unique solution of an
optimal transport problem, but unlike the present paper, they are restricted to the case
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with a discrete quality space. The strategy is extended to the set-valued case by Chiong,
Galichon, and Shum (2013), who use subdifferential calculus for identification of dynamic
discrete choice problems. Dupuy, Galichon, and Henry (2014) use network flow techniques
to identify discrete hedonic models.
Notation. Throughout the paper, we use the following notational conventions. Let f(x, y)
be a real-valued function on Rd × Rd. When f is sufficiently smooth, the gradient of f
with respect to x is denoted ∇xf , the matrix of second order derivatives with respect
to x and y is denoted D2xyf . When f is not smooth, ∂xf refers to the subdifferential
with respect to x, from Definition 5, and ∇ap,xf refers to the approximate gradient with
respect to x, from Definition 7. The set of all Borel probability distributions on a set Z
is denoted ∆(Z). A random vector ε with probability distribution P is denoted ε ∼ P ,
and X ∼ Y means that the random vectors X and Y have the same distribution. The
product of two probability distributions µ and ν is denoted µ⊗ ν and for a map f : X 7→ Y
and µ ∈ ∆(X), ν := f#µ is the probability distribution on Y defined for each Borel subset A
of Y by ν(A) = µ(f−1(A)). For instance, if T is a map from X to Y and ν a probability
distribution on X, then µ := (id, T )#ν defines the probability distribution on X × Y
by µ(A) =
∫
X
1A(x, T (x))dµ(x) for all measurable subset A of X×Y . Given two probability
distributions µ and ν on X and Y respectively,M(µ, ν) will denote the subset of ∆(X×Y )
containing all probability distributions with marginals µ and ν. We denote the inner product
of two vectors x and y by x′y. The Euclidean norm is denoted ‖ · ‖. The notation |a| refers
to the absolute value of the real number a, whereas |A| refers to the Lebesgue measure of
set A. The set of all continuous real valued functions on Z is denoted C0(Z) and Br(x) is
the open ball of radius r centered at x. Finally, V ∗ and V ∗∗ denote the convex conjugate
and double conjugate (also called convex envelope) of a function V , as defined in (2) and
below, and V ζ and V ζζ denote the ζ-convex conjugate and double conjugate, as defined
in (2) and (7).
Organization of the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
sets the hedonic equilibrium framework out. Section 3 gives an account of the main results
on nonparametric identification of preferences in single attribute hedonic models, mostly
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drawn from Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004) and Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim
(2010). Section 4 is the main section of the paper and shows how these results and the
shape restrictions that drive them can be extended to the case of multiple attribute hedonic
equilibrium markets. The last section discusses future research directions. Proofs of the
main results are relegated to the appendix, as are necessary background results on optimal
transport theory and hedonic equilibrium theory. We classify assumptions according to
their type and function. Assumptions EC (equilibrium concept) and H (unobserved het-
erogeneity) refer to the model structure. Assumptions R1, R2 and R3 are nested regularity
assumptions on the primitives of the model. Assumptions S1, S2 and S3 are shape restric-
tions on the utility function, and Assumptions C2 and C3 are shape restrictions on the
consumer potential, from Definition 1.
2. Hedonic equilibrium and the identification problem
We consider a competitive environment, where consumers and producers trade a good or
contract, fully characterized by its type or quality z. The set of feasible qualities Z ⊆ Rdz
is assumed compact and given a priori, but the distribution of the qualities actually traded
arise endogenously in the hedonic market equilibrium, as does their price schedule p(z).
Producers are characterized by their type y˜ ∈ Y˜ ⊆ Rdy˜ and consumers by their type
x˜ ∈ X˜ ⊆ Rdx˜ . Type distributions Px˜ on X˜ and Py˜ on Y˜ are given exogenously, so that entry
and exit are not modelled. Consumers and producers are price takers and maximize quasi-
linear utility U(x˜, z)−p(z) and profit p(z)−C(y˜, z) respectively. Utility U(x˜, z) (respectively
cost C(y˜, z)) is upper (respectively lower) semicontinuous and bounded and normalized to
zero in case of nonparticipation. In addition, the set of qualities Z(x˜, y˜) that maximize the
joint surplus U(x˜, z)−C(y˜, z) for each pair of types (x˜, y˜) is assumed to have a measurable
selection. Then, Ekeland (2010) and Chiappori, McCann, and Nesheim (2010) show that an
equilibrium exists in this market, in the form of a price function p on Z, a joint distribution
Px˜z on X˜ × Z and Py˜z on Y˜ × Z such that their marginal on Z coincide, so that market
clears for each traded quality z ∈ Z. Uniqueness is not guaranteed, in particular prices
are not uniquely defined for non traded qualities in equilibrium. Purity is not guaranteed
either: an equilibrium specifies a conditional distribution Pz|x˜ (respectively Pz|y˜) of qualities
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consumed by type x˜ consumers (respectively produced by type y˜ producers). The quality
traded by a given producer-consumer pair (x˜, y˜) is not uniquely determined at equilibrium.
Ekeland (2010) and Chiappori, McCann, and Nesheim (2010) further show that a pure
equilibrium exists and is unique, under the additional assumption that type distributions Px˜
and Py˜ are absolutely continuous and gradients of utility and cost, ∇x˜U(x˜, z) and ∇y˜C(y˜, z)
exist and are injective as functions of quality z. The latter condition, also known as the
Twist Condition in the optimal transport literature, ensures that all consumers of a given
type x˜ (respectively all producers of a given type y˜) consume (respectively produce) the
same quality z at equilibrium.
The identification problem consists in the recovery of structural features of preferences
and technology from observation of traded qualities and their prices in a single market. The
solution concept we impose in our identification analysis is the following feature of hedonic
equilibrium, i.e., maximization of surplus generated by a trade.
Assumption EC. [Equilibrium concept] The joint distribution γ of (X˜, Z, Y˜ ) and the
price function p form an hedonic equilibrium, i.e., they satisfy the following. The joint
distribution γ has marginals Px˜ and Py˜ and for γ-almost all (x˜, z, y˜),
U(x˜, z)− p(z) = max
z′∈Z
(
U(x˜, z′)− p(z′)
)
,
p(z)− C(y˜, z) = max
z′∈Z
(
p(z′)− C(y˜, z)
)
.
In addition, observed qualities z ∈ Z(x˜, y˜) maximizing joint surplus U(x˜, z) − C(y˜, z) for
each x˜ ∈ X˜ and y˜ ∈ Y˜ , lie in the interior of the set of feasible qualities Z and Z(x˜, y˜)
is assumed to have a measurable selection. The joint surplus U(x˜, z) − C(y˜, z) is finite
everywhere.
Remark 1. An important implication of Assumption EC is that traded quality z maximizes
the joint surplus U(x˜, z) − C(y˜, z). This observation is the basis for the equivalent charac-
terization of hedonic models as transferable utility matching models in Chiappori, McCann,
and Nesheim (2010).
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Remark 2. We assume full participation in the market. The possibility of non participation
can modelled by adding isolated points to the sets of types and renormalizing distributions
accordingly (see Section 1.1 of Chiappori, McCann, and Nesheim (2010) for details).
Remark 3. Under Assumption EC, we will denote throughout the projections of γ on X˜×Z
and Y˜ × Z by Px˜z and Py˜z, respectively. The projections on X˜, Y˜ and Z will be de-
noted Px˜, Py˜ and Pz, respectively.
Given observability of prices and the fact that producer type y˜ (respectively consumer
type x˜) does not enter into the utility function U(x˜, z) (respectively cost function C(y˜, z))
directly, we may consider the consumer and producer problems separately and symmetri-
cally. We focus on the consumer problem and on identification of utility function U(x˜, z).
Under assumptions ensuring purity and uniqueness of equilibrium, the model predicts a
deterministic choice of quality z for a given consumer type x˜. We do not impose such as-
sumptions, but we need to account for heterogeneity in consumption patterns even in case
of unique and pure equilibrium. Hence, we assume, as is customary, that consumer types x˜
are only partially observable to the analyst. We write x˜ = (x, ε), where x ∈ X ⊆ Rdx is the
observable part of the type vector, and ε ∈ Rdz is the unobservable part, whose dimension
is the same as the dimension of good quality z. We shall make a separability assumption
that will allow us to specify constraints on the interaction between consumer unobservable
type ε and good quality z in order to identify interactions between observable type x and
good quality z.
Assumption H. [Unobservable heterogeneity] Consumer type x˜ is composed of observable
type x with distribution Px on X ⊆ R
dx and unobservable type ε with a priori speci-
fied conditional distribution Pε|x on R
dz . The utility of consumers can be decomposed
as U(x˜, z) = U¯(x, z) + ζ(x, ε, z), where the functional form of ζ is known, but that of U¯
is not.
Remark 4. Despite the notation used, U¯ should not necessarily be interpreted as mean
utility, since we allow for a general choice of ζ and Pε|x. If this interpretation is desirable
in a particular application, ζ and Pε|x can be chosen in such a way that E[ζ(x, ε, z)|x] = 0.
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Remark 5. Specification of Pε|x is a necessary normalization, which also arises in quantile
identification strategies.
We shall work throughout under the following regularity condition on the primitives of
the hedonic equilibrium model.
Assumption R1. [Regularity of preferences and technology] The functions U(x˜, z), C(y˜, z)
and ζ(x, ε, z) are twice continuously differentiable with respect to all their arguments.
The object of inference is the deterministic component of utility U¯(x, z).
Definition 1. For each (x, z) ∈ X × Z, we shall denote V (x, z) := p(z)− U¯(x, z) and call
it the consumer’s potential.
We focus on identification of the function V , since under observability of price, it is
equivalent to identification of the function U¯(x, z), which is our objective.
We shall work in stages, recalling first existing identification results in case of scalar z
and clarifying which features we intend to extend and how. The guiding principle will be
the characterization of shape restrictions on the function V that extend single crossing and
monotonicity restrictions in the scalar case and remain just identifying in the multi-attribute
case.
3. Single market identification with scalar attribute
In this section, we recall and reformulate results of Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim
(2010) on identification of single attribute hedonic models. Suppose, for the purpose of this
section, that dz = 1, so that unobserved heterogeneity is scalar, as is the quality dimension.
Suppose further (for ease of exposition) that ζ is twice continuously differentiable in z and ε
(as in Assumption R1) and that V is twice continuously differentiable in z. Consumers take
price schedule p(z) as given and choose quality z to maximize ζ(x, ε, z)−V (x, z). We impose
a single crossing condition on ζ.
Assumption S1. [Spence-Mirlees] Dimension dz of Z is 1 and ζεz(x, ε, z) > 0 for all x, ε, z.
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The first order condition of the consumer problem yields
ζz(x, ε, z) = Vz(x, z), (1)
which, under Assumption S1, implicitly defines an inverse demand function z 7→ ε(x, z),
which specifies which unobserved type consumes quality z. Combining the second or-
der condition ζzz(x, ε, z) < Vzz(x, z) and further differentiation of (1), i.e., ζzz(x, ε, z) +
ζεz(x, ε, z)εz(x, z) = Vzz(x, z), yields
εz(x, z) =
Vzz(x, z)− ζzz(x, ε, z)
ζεz(x, ε, z)
> 0.
Hence the inverse demand is increasing and is therefore identified as the unique increasing
function that maps the distribution Pz|x to the distribution Pε|x, namely the quantile trans-
form. Denoting F the cumulative distribution function corresponding to the distribution P ,
we therefore have identification of inverse demand according to the strategy put forward in
Matzkin (2003) as:
ε(x, z) = F−1
ε|x
(
Fz|x(z|x)
)
.
The single crossing condition of Assumption S1 on the consumer surplus function ζ(x, ε, z)
yields positive assortative matching, as in the Becker (1973) classical model. Consumers
with higher taste for quality ε will choose higher qualities in equilibrium and positive as-
sortative matching drives identification of demand for quality. The important feature of
Assumption S1 is injectivity of ζz(x, ε, z) relative to ε and a similar argument would have
carried through under ζzε(x, ε, z) < 0, yielding negative assortative matching instead.
Once inverse demand is identified, the consumer potential V (x, z), hence the utility func-
tion U¯(x, z), can be recovered up to a constant by integration of the first order condition (1):
U¯(x, z) = p(z)− V (x, z) = p(z)−
∫ z
0
ζz(x, ε(x, z
′), z′)dz′.
We summarize the previous discussion in the following identification statement, originally
due to Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim (2010).
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions EC, H, R1, S1, U¯(x, z) is nonparametrically identified,
in the sense that z 7→ U¯z(x, z) is the only marginal utility function compatible with the
pair (Pxz, p), i.e., any other marginal utility function coincides with it, Pz|x almost surely.
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Unlike the demand function, which is identified without knowledge of the surplus func-
tion ζ, as long as the latter satisfies single crossing (Assumption S1), identification of the
preference function U¯(x, z) does require a priori knowledge of the function ζ. This includes
existing results in this literature. Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004) cover the case
where ζ(x, ε, z) = zε and do so without assuming that the distribution of unobserved het-
erogeneity Pε|x is known. In that case, ε(x, z) increasing in z, maximizes E[zε|x] among all
joint distributions for (z, ε), subject to the marginal restrictions that z ∼ Pz|x and ε ∼ Pε|x.
This follows from the classical Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya (1952) inequalities. This opti-
mization formulation is dimension free and is the key to our extension of the identification
argument to the case of a vector of qualities z. The maximization of E[zε|x] has a natural
extension in the multivariate case ζ(x, ε, z) = z′ε, where quality z and taste for quality ε
are conformable vectors. We shall examine the case ζ(x, ε, z) = z′ε in the next section,
before moving to the general extension with arbitrary surplus function ζ(x, ε, z), allowing
marginal utility to be nonlinear in unobserved taste, hence allowing interactions between
consumer and good characteristics in the utility.
4. Single market identification with multiple attributes
4.1. Marginal utility linear in unobserved taste. We now turn to the main objective
of the paper, which is to derive identifying shape restrictions in the multi-attribute case of
quality z ∈ Rdz and unobserved taste ε ∈ Rdz , with dz > 1. We start with the case where
marginal utility is linear in unobserved taste.
Assumption S2. The surplus function is ζ(x, ε, z) = z′ε.
Remark 6. A natural interpretation of this specification is that to each quality dimension zj
is associated a specific unobserved taste intensity εj for that particular quality dimension.
Under Assumption S2, the consumer maximization problem is that of finding
sup
z∈Z
{U¯(x, z) + z′ε− p(z)} = sup
z∈Z
{z′ε− V (x, z)} := V ∗(x, ε). (2)
For each fixed x ∈ X, the function ε 7→ V ∗(x, ε) defined in (2) is called the convex con-
jugate (also known as Legendre-Fenchel transform) of z 7→ V (x, z). Still for fixed x, the
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convex conjugate z 7→ V ∗∗(x, ε) := supε∈Rdz {z
′ε − V ∗(x, ε)} is called the double conjugate
of the potential function z 7→ V (x, z). According to convex duality theory (see for instance
Rockafellar (1970), Theorem 12.2 page 104), the double conjugate of V is V itself if and
only if z 7→ V (x, z) is convex and lower-semi-continuous, as a function of z. Under suitable
regularity, the first order condition from the program supε{z
′ε− V ∗(x, ε)} yields a demand
for quality function z = ∇εV
∗(x, ε). Similarly, the first order condition from the consumer
maximization problem (2) yields an inverse demand for quality function ε = ∇zV (x, z). If
the consumer’s potential V is convex, as a function of z, we will show that the demand
and inverse demand functions are uniquely determined. Convexity of V with respect to its
second variable z, therefore, turns out to be the shape restriction that delivers identification
in this case where marginal utility is linear in unobserved taste.
Assumption C2. [Convexity restriction] The function V (x, z) is convex in z for all x.
Convexity of V implies that the inverse demand function ε = ∇zV (x, z) is the gradient
of a convex function (as a function of z, for each x). In the univariate case developed in
the previous section, this corresponds to inverse demand being a non decreasing function.
Hence, in the case where both z and ε are scalar, higher levels of quality z are chosen by
consumers with higher levels of ε, interpreted as unobserved taste for quality. We therefore
recover the property of assortative matching, delivered in Section 3 by the single crossing
shape restriction on ζ, namely Assumption S1.
As discussed in Section 3, positive assortative matching (monotonicity of demand) is
difficult to extend to the multi-attribute case, but not the efficiency result that comes with
positive assortative matching. Imagine a social planner maximizing total surplus over the
distribution of heterogeneous consumers. The planner’s problem is to maximize E[z′ε|x]
over all possible allocations of qualities z to consumer types ε, i.e., over all pairs of random
vectors (ε, z) under the constraint that the marginal distributions Pε|x and Pz|x are fixed.
One of the central results of optimal transport theory, Brenier’s Theorem (Theorem 1
in Appendix 6.1), shows precisely that such a planner’s problem admits a unique pure
allocation as solution, which takes the form of the inverse demand function ε = ∇zV (x, z)
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with V (x, z) convex in z. We see thereby that convexity of V (x, z) in z is the shape
restriction that delivers identification as summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Identification with linear marginal utility in taste). Under Assumptions EC,
H, R1, S2 and C2, the following statements hold:
(1) U¯(x, z) is nonparametrically identified, in the sense that z 7→ ∇zU¯(x, z) is the only
marginal utility function compatible with the pair (Pxz , p), i.e., any other marginal
utility function coincides with it, Pz|x almost surely.
(2) For all x ∈ X, U¯(x, z) = p(z)−V (x, z) and z 7→ V (x, z) is the convex solution to the
optimization problem minV (Ez[V (x, z)|x] + Eε[V
∗(x, ε)|x]), where ε 7→ V ∗(x, ε) is
the convex conjugate of z 7→ V (x, z) (convex conjugation with respect to the second
variable).
The structure of this identification proof is as follows (see the proof of Theorem 4, of
which this is a special case). We show that there exists a unique allocation of qualities
to tastes z 7→ ε(x, z) that maximizes the consumer problem (2). A significant portion
of the proof is dedicated to showing that the endogenous price function z 7→ p(z), hence
z 7→ V (x, z), is differentiable. Hence, once the allocation (inverse demand function) ε(x, z)
is identified, V (x, z) satisfies the first order condition
∇zV (x, z) = ∇zζ(x, ε(x, z), z) = ε(x, z), Pz|x-almost surely, for every x.
The latter determines V (x, z), and therefore U¯(x, z), up to a constant.
Remark 7. The identification is constructive, as V (x, z) is shown to be the convex solution
to the minimization of E[V (x, z)|x] + E[V ∗(x, ε)|x], where V ∗ is the convex conjugate of V
with respect to the second variable.
Identification under primitive restrictions only. Since the consumer potential V (x, z) is
equal to p(z) − U¯(x, z), it involves the endogenous price function. Hence, Theorem 1
involves a condition on the potential V , which is undesirable, since it constrains a non
primitive quantity in the model, namely the endogenous price function. However, we show
that, as monotonicity of inverse demand in the scalar case was implied by the single crossing
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condition, here, convexity of V in z is “essentially” always true under the maintained
primitive conditions, in the sense of the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Convexity). Under Assumptions EC and H, for all x, V (x, z) = V ∗∗(x, z),
Pz|x almost surely, where
∗∗ denotes double convex conjugation with respect to the second
variable.
As we have seen above, the function V is equal to its double conjugate V ∗∗ if and only if it
is convex and lower semi-continuous. Hence Lemma 1 implies in particular, that on any open
subset of the support of Pz|x, V (x, z) is a convex function of z as required. It also implies,
as will be shown in Theorem 2, that the convexity assumption becomes unnecessary if the
distribution of qualities traded at equilibrium is absolutely continuous. We therefore give
conditions on the primitives of the model, such that the endogenous distribution of qualities
traded is absolutely continuous. This will allow us to dispense entirely from restrictions on
endogenous qualities in the statement of our identification theorem.
Assumption R2. [Conditions for absolute continuity of Pz|x] Assumption R1 holds.
(1) The Hessian of total surplus D2zz (U(x, ǫ, z) − C(y˜, z)) is bounded above; that is
D2zz (U(x, ǫ, z) − C(y˜, z)) ≤M1 for all x, ǫ, z, y˜, for some fixed M1.
(2) The distribution of unobserved tastes Pε|x is absolutely continuous with respect to
Lebesgue measure for all x.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions EC, H, S2 and R2, the endogenous distribution Pz|x of
qualities traded at equilibrium is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure.
Remark 8. Lemma 2 is a crucial step in our identification strategy, but beyond its role
in identification, it is an important result in its own right within the theory of hedonic
equilibrium models.
Lemma 2 allows us to dispense with the convexity assumption on z 7→ V (x, z), which
implicitely involved a constraint on the endogenous price function z 7→ p(z). We can now
state our identification theorem based exclusively on restrictions on primitive quantities,
namely, preferences, technology and the distributions of consumer and producer types.
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Theorem 2. Under Assumptions EC, H, R2 and S2, the following statements hold:
(1) U¯(x, z) is nonparametrically identified, in the sense that z 7→ ∇zU¯(x, z) is the only
marginal utility function compatible with the pair (Pxz , p), i.e., any other marginal
utility function coincides with it, Pz|x almost surely.
(2) For all x ∈ X, U¯(x, z) = p(z)− V (x, z) and z 7→ V (x, z) is Pz|x almost everywhere
equal to the convex solution to the problem minV (Ez[V (x, z)|x] + Eε[V
∗(x, ε)|x]),
where ε 7→ V ∗(x, ε) is the convex conjugate of z 7→ V (x, z) (convex conjugation with
respect to the second variable).
Remark 9. Unlike Theorem 1, Theorem 2 above delivers an identification result based
only on restrictions on the primities of the model. These restrictions are mild regularity
conditions on preferences and technology, namely Assumption R2(1), and regularity of the
conditional distribution Pε|x of unobserved types, namely Assumption R2(2). Note, in par-
ticular, that no regularity is assumed for the distribution of observable consumer types Px
or the distribution of producer types Py˜, so that discrete observable characteristics are also
covered by the result.
Nonlinear simultaneous equations. The reasoning behind the identification result of The-
orem 1 has implications beyond hedonic equilibrium models, as it provides identification
conditions for a general nonlinear nonseparable simultaneous equations econometric model
of the form z = h(x, ε), where the vector of endogenous variables z has the same dimension
as the vector of unobserved heterogeneity ε. Theorem 3 shows that in such models, h is
nonparametrically identified within the class of gradients of convex functions.
Theorem 3 (Nonlinear simultaneous equations). In the simultaneous equations model z =
h(x, ε), with z, ε ∈ Rdz and x ∈ Rdx, the function ε 7→ h(x, ε) is identified under the
following conditions.
(1) ε 7→ h(x, ε) is the gradient of a convex function in ε for all x ∈ X.
(2) For all x ∈ X, Pε|x is specified a priori and is absolutely continuous with respect to
Lebesgue measure and Pε|x and Pz|x have finite variance.
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In the univariate case, gradients of convex functions are the increasing functions, so that
our identifying shape restriction directly generalizes monotonicity in Matzkin (2003).
4.2. General case. The identification result of Theorem 1 can be easily extended to
allow for variation in the quality-unobserved taste interaction with observed type x as
in ζ(x, ε, z) = φ(z)′ψ(x, ε), where φ and ψ are known functions and φ is invertible. Going
beyond this requires a new type of shape restriction that can be interpreted as a multivariate
extension of the single crossing “Spence-Mirlees” condition of Assumption S1.
Recalling our notation V (x, z) = p(z) − U¯(x, z), the consumer’s program is to choose
quality vector z to maximize
sup
z∈Z
{U¯ (x, z) + ζ(xε, z) − p(z)} = sup
z∈Z
{ζ(x, ε, z) − V (x, z)}. (3)
In the one dimensional case, single crossing condition ζεz(x, ε, z) > 0 delivered identification
of inverse demand. We noted that the sign of the single crossing condition was not important
for the identification result. Instead, what is crucial is the following, weaker, condition.
Assumption S3. [Twist Condition] For all x and z, the gradient ∇zζ(x, ε, z) of ζ(x, ε, z)
in z is injective as a function of ε on the support of Pε|x.
Remark 10. As is well known from Gale and Nikaido (1965), it is sufficient that D2zεζ(x, ε, z)
be positive quasi-definite everywhere for Assumption S3 to be satisfied. A weaker set of con-
ditions is given in Theorem 2 of Mas-Colell (1979).
Remark 11. Assumption S3, unlike the single crossing condition, is well defined in the
multivariate case, and we shall show, using recent developments in optimal transport theory,
that it continues to deliver the desired identification in the multivariate case.
Before stating the theorem, we provide more intuition by further developing the parallel
between this general case and the cases covered so far. Notice that the Twist Condition
of Assumption S3 is satisfied in the particular case of marginal utility linear in taste, as
considered in Section 4.1 above.
Consider, as before, the hedonic market from the point of view of a social planner,
who allocates qualities z to tastes ε in a way that maximizes total consumer surplus. The
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distribution of consumer tastes is Pε|x and the distribution of qualities traded at equilibrium
is Pz|x. For fixed observable type x, the variable surplus of a match between unobserved
taste ε and quality z is ζ(x, ε, z). Hence, the planner’s problem is to find an allocation of
qualities to tastes, in the form of a joint probability µ over the pair of random vectors (ε, z),
so as to maximize Eµ[ζ(x, ε, z)|x] under the constraint that ε has marginal distribution Pε|x
and that z has marginal distribution Pz|x. This planner’s problem
max
µ
Eµ[ζ(x, ε, z)|x] subject to ε ∼ Pε|x, z ∼ Pz|x (4)
is equal to its dual
min
V,W
E[W (x, ε)|x] + E[V (x, z)|x] subject to W (x, ε) + V (x, z) ≥ ζ(x, ε, z) (5)
and both primal (4) and dual (5) are attained under the conditions of the Monge-Kantorovitch
Theorem (Theorem 6 in Appendix 6.1). Notice that the constraint in (5) can be written as
W (x, ε) = sup
z∈Z
{ζ(x, ε, z) − V (x, z)} := V ζ(x, ε), (6)
so that W (x, ε) is a candidate for the demand function mapping tastes ε into qualities
z derived from the consumer’s program (3). Equation (6) defines a generalized notion of
convex conjugation, which can be inverted, similarly to convex conjugation, into:
V ζζ(x, z) = sup
ε∈Rdz
{ζ(x, ε, z) − V ζ(x, ε)}, (7)
where V ζζ is called the double conjugate of V by analogy with V ∗∗.
Definition 2 (ζ-convexity). A function V is called ζ-convex if and only if V ζζ = V .
The requirement of ζ-convexity, therefore, is a shape restriction that directly generalizes
the convexity restriction of Assumption C2 in case of marginal utility linear in unobserved
taste.
Assumption C3. [ζ-convexity] The potential V is ζ-convex as a function of z for all x.
Under Assumptions EC, H, R1, S3 and C3, we show that there exists a unique allocation
of qualities to tastes z 7→ ε(x, z) that maximizes the consumer problem (6). Moreover,
this allocation is such that markets clear, since ε(x, z) is distributed according to Pε|x
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when z is distributed according to Pz|x. Heuristically, by the envelope theorem applied to
V (x, z) = supε{ζ(x, ε, z) − V
ζ(x, ε)}, for a small variation δV ζ of V ζ , the variation in V
is δV (x, z) = −δV ζ(x, ε(x, z), z). Plugging the latter into the first order condition for (5)
yields E[δV ζ(x, ε)|x] = E[δV ζ(x, ε(x, z))|x]. The latter holds for any small variation δV ζ , so
that the distribution of allocation ε(x, z) is the same as the exogenously given distribution
of unobserved tastes Pε|x, so that the market clears.
Finally, once the allocation (inverse demand function) ε(x, z) is identified, V (x, z) satisfies
the first order condition of the consumer’s program
∇zV (x, z) = ∇p(z)−∇zU¯(x, z) = ∇zζ(x, ε(x, z), z), Pz|x-almost surely, for every x.
The latter determines V (x, z), and therefore U¯(x, z), up to a constant. We are now ready
to state our main theorem, relating the Twist Condition and the ζ-convex shape restriction
to nonparametric identification of preferences.
Theorem 4 (Identification of preferences). Under Assumptions EC, H, R1, S3 and C3,
the following statements hold:
(1) U¯(x, z) is nonparametrically identified, in the sense that z 7→ ∇zU¯(x, z) is the only
marginal utility function compatible with the pair (Pxz , p), i.e., any other marginal
utility function coincides with it, Pz|x almost surely.
(2) For all x ∈ X, U¯(x, z) = p(z)− V (x, z) and z 7→ V (x, z) is the ζ-convex solution to
the problem minV
(
Ez[V (x, z)|x] + Eε[V
ζ(x, ε)|x]
)
, with V ζ defined in (6).
Remark 12. As before, the identification strategy is constructive and efficient computa-
tion of U¯(x, z) = p(z) − V (x, z) is based on the identification of V as the solution to the
optimization problem of Theorem 4(2).
4.2.1. Identification under primitive restrictions only. As discussed in the previous section,
Assumption C3 involves restrictions on the price function p(z), which is endogenously deter-
mined at equilibrium. We show, however, that the Twist Condition of Assumption S3 is the
relevant shape restriction, corresponding to single crossing, and that ζ-convexity follows, in
the sense of the following lemma.
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Lemma 3. Under Assumptions EC and H, V (x, z) = V ζζ(x, z), Pz|x-a.s., for all x.
Again, this lemma allows us to dispense completely with conditions on non primitive
quantities (here, the function V , which depends on the endogenous price function) un-
der conditions such that the endogenous distribution of qualities traded at equilibrium is
absolutely continuous.
Assumption R3. [Conditions for absolute continuity of Pz|x] Assumption R2 holds.
(1) The function z 7→ ∇ǫζ(x, ǫ, z) is injective, as a function of z ∈ Z.
(2) For each x ∈ X, ∇zζ(x, ε, z)→∞ as ‖ε‖ → ∞, uniformly in z ∈ Z.
(3) The matrix D2ǫzζ(x, ε, z) has full rank for all x, ε, z. Its inverse [D
2
ǫzζ(x, ε, z)]
−1 has
uniform upper bound M0.
Lemma 4. Under Assumptions EC, H, S3 and R3, the endogenous distribution Pz|x of
qualities traded at equilibrium is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure.
Under the assumptions of Lemma 4, we obtain an identification result that relies only
on constraints on the primitive quantities of the model, namely preferences, technology and
the distributions of consumer and producer types.
Theorem 5. Under Assumptions EC, H, S3 and R3, the following statements hold:
(1) U¯(x, z) is nonparametrically identified, in the sense that z 7→ ∇zU¯(x, z) is the only
marginal utility function compatible with the pair (Pxz , p), i.e., any other marginal
utility function coincides with it, Pz|x almost surely.
(2) For all x ∈ X, U¯(x, z) = p(z)− V (x, z) and z 7→ V (x, z) is Pz|x almost everywhere
equal to the ζ-convex solution to the problem minV
(
Ez[V (x, z)|x] + Eε[V
ζ(x, ε)|x]
)
,
with V ζ defined in (6).
Again, the identification result of Theorem 4 has ramifications beyond the framework of
hedonic equilibrium models. Indeed, it provides the just identifying shape restriction for
general consumer problems with multivariate unobserved preference heterogeneity, where
consumers choose within a set of goods, differentiated along more than one dimension.
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Theorem 4 tells us that the shape of interactions between good qualities and unobserved
tastes governs the shape restriction that just identifies the utility function.
5. Discussion
The identification results in the paper rely on observations from a single price schedule
and the structural functions are just identified under normalization of the distribution of
unobserved heterogeneity. Although U¯(x, z) is not identified without such a normalization,
or additional restrictions, there are features of preferences that are identified. Consider
our model under Assumption S2, with U(x, ε, z) = U¯(x, z) + z′ε. From Theorem 8 in Ap-
pendix 6.1, the inverse demand ε(x, z) = ∇z
[
p(z)− U¯(x, z)
]
satisfies the following: for
all bounded continuous functions ξ,
∫
ξ(ε)fε(ε)dε =
∫
ξ
(
∇zp(z)−∇zU¯(x, z)
)
fz|x(z|x)dz.
Hence, taking ξ equal to the identity above and assuming only that Pε|x has mean zero,
instead of fixing the whole distribution, yields identification of the averaged partial ef-
fects E
[
∇zU¯(x,Z)|X = x
]
= E [∇p(Z)|X = x] from the fact that p(z) and Pz|x are identi-
fied.
Going beyond the latter result requires additional assumptions, which can take either of
the following forms. (1) A separability assumption of the form U¯(x, z) := z′α(x) + β(z)
can be imposed, in which case, the strategy outlined in Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim
(2004) can be extended to the case of multiple attributes and yield identification without
normalization of the distribution of unobserved tastes for quality ε. (2) Data from mul-
tiple markets can be brought to bear on the identification problem, or more generally a
variable that shifts underlying distributions of producers and consumers, without affect-
ing preferences and technology. To fix ideas, suppose two seperate markets m1 and m2
(separate in the sense that producers, consumers or goods cannot move between markets)
with underlying producer and consumer distributions (Pm1x , P
m1
y˜ ) and (P
m2
x , P
m2
y˜ ), are at
equilibrium, with respective price schedules pm1(z) and pm2(z). The additional identifica-
tion assumption is that utility U¯(x, z) and unobserved taste distribution Pε|x are common
across the two markets. In each market, we recover a nonparametrically identified utility
function U¯m(x, z;Pε|x), where the dependence in the unknown distribution of tastes Pε|x
is emphasized. Therefore, the additional identifying restriction associated with multiple
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markets data takes the form U¯m1(x, z;Pε|x) = U¯
m2(x, z;Pε|x) which defines an identified
set for the pair (U¯ , Pε|x). Further research is needed to characterize this identified set and
derive conditions for point identification in this setting.
6. Appendix
Throughout Appendix 6.1, when there is no ambiguity, we drop the conditioning variable x from the
notation and consider the theory of optimal transportation of distribution Pz of quality vector z ∈ R
d to
distribution Pε of vector of unobserved tastes ε ∈ R
d. In Appendix 6.2, where we prove the results in the
main text, the conditioning variable will be reintroduced.
6.1. Optimal transportation results.
Monge-Kantorovich problem. We first consider the Kantorovich problem, which is the probabilistic allocation
of qualities to tastes so as to maximize total surplus, where the surplus of a pair (ε, z) is given by the
function ζ(ε, z), and the marginal distributions of qualities Pz and tastes Pε are fixed constraints. We
therefore define the set of allocations that satisfy the constraints as follows.
Definition 3 (Probabilities with given marginals). We denote M(Pε, Pz) the set of probability distributions
on Rd × Rd with marginal distributions Pε and Pz.
With this definition, we can formally state the Kantorovitch problem as follows.
(PK) = sup
pi∈M(Pε,Pz)
∫
ζ(ε, z)dpi(ε, z).
If we consider the special case of surpluses that are separable in ε and z and dominate ζ(ε, z), i.e., of the
form W (ε)+V (z) ≥ ζ(ε, z), the integral yields
∫
W (ε)dPε(ε)+
∫
V (z)dPz(z). We denote Φζ the set of such
functions.
Definition 4 (Admissible set). A pair of function (W,V ) on Rd belongs to the admissible set Φζ if and only
if W ∈ L1(Pε), V ∈ L
1(Pz) and W (ε) + V (z) ≥ ζ(ε, z) for Pε-almost all ε and Pz-almost all z.
The integral over separable surpluses
(DK) = inf
(W,V )∈Φζ
∫
W (ε)dPε(ε) +
∫
V (z)dPz(z)
will in general yield a weakly larger total surplus than (PK), but it turns out that under very weak conditions,
the two coincide.
Theorem 6 (Kantorovich duality). If ζ is upper semi-continuous, then (PK)=(MK) and there exists an
allocation pi ∈M(Pε, Pz) that achieves the maximum in (PK).
22 VICTOR CHERNOZHUKOV, ALFRED GALICHON, MARC HENRY AND BRENDAN PASS
A proof of the Kantorovich duality theorem can be found in Chapter 1 of Villani (2003). We give here
the intuition of the result based on switching infimum and supremum operations. First, if ζ is a continuous
function, the mapping µ 7→
∫
ζdµ is weakly continuous. Since M(Pε, Pz) is weakly compact, the maximum
in (PK) is achieved for some pi by the Weierstrass Theorem. Hence, an optimal allocation exists. However,
continuity of ζ is not necessary.
To see the duality result, denote χA(x) = 0 if x ∈ A and −∞ otherwise. Then, we verify that
χM(Pε,Pz)(pi) = inf
(W,V )
{∫
W (ε)dPε(ε) +
∫
V (z)dPz(z)−
∫
(W (ε) + V (z)) dpi(ε, z)
}
,
where the infimum is over all integrable functions, say. Now we can rewrite (PK) as follows:
(PK) = sup
pi
{∫
ζ(ε, z)dpi(ε, z) + χM(Pε,Pz)(pi)
}
,
where the supremum is taken over positive measures pi. Assuming the infimum and supremum operations
can be switched yields:
(PK) = inf
(W,V )
sup
pi
{∫
ζ(ε, z)dpi(ε, z)
+
∫
W (z)dPε(ε) +
∫
V (z)dPz(z)−
∫
(W (ε) + V (z)) dpi(ε, z)
}
= inf
(W,V )
{∫
W (z)dPε(ε) +
∫
V (z)dPz(z)
− inf
pi
∫
(W (ε) + V (z)− ζ(ε, z)) dpi(ε, z)
}
.
Consider the second infimum in the last display. If the function W (ε)+V (z)− ζ(ε, z) takes a negative value,
then, choosing for pi the Dirac mass at that point will yield an infimum of −∞. Therefore, we have:
inf
pi
∫
(W (ε) + V (z)− ζ(ε, z)) dpi(ε, z) = χΦζ (W,V ),
so that
(PK) = inf
(W,V )
{∫
W (z)dPε(ε) +
∫
V (z)dPz(z)− χΦζ (W,V )
}
= (DK)
as required.
We now see that the dual is also achieved.
Theorem 7 (Kantorovich duality (continued)). If (PK)<∞ and there exist integrable functions ζε and ζz
such that ζ(ε, z) ≥ ζε(ε) + ζz(z), then there exists a ζ-convex function (see Definition 2) V such that∫
V ζ(ε)dPε(ε) +
∫
V (z)dPz(z)
achieves (DK). In addition, if pi is an optimal allocation, i.e., achieves (PK), and (V ζ , V ) is an optimal ζ-
conjugate pair, i.e., achieves (DK), then
V ζ(ε) + V (z) ≥ ζ(ε, z) with equality pi-almost surely. (8)
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Idea of the proof. The proof can be found in Chapter 5 of Villani (2009). The last statement of The-
orem 7 is easy to see. If pi achieves (PK) and (V ζ , V ) achieves (DK), then, as (PK)=(DK) by Theo-
rem 6, we have
∫
[V ζ(ε) + V (z) − ζ(ε, z)]dpi(ε, z) = 0. The integrand is non negative, since (V ζ , V ) ∈ Φζ .
Hence, V ζ + V = ζ, pi-almost surely, as desired. The proof of existence of an optimal pair of ζ-convex
functions achieving (DK) revolves around the notion of cyclical monotonicity.
In view of the above, if (φ, ψ) achieve (DK) and a sequence of pairs (εi, zi)i=1,...,m belong to the support
of the optimal allocation pi, then φ(εi) + ψ(zi) = ζ(εi, zi) for each i = 1, . . . ,m. On the other hand,
since (φ,ψ) ∈ Φζ , we have φ(εi)+ψ(zi+1) ≥ ζ(εi, zi+1) for each i = 1, . . . ,m−1, and φ(εm)+ψ(z) ≥ ζ(εm, z)
for an arbitrary z. Substracting and adding up yields
ψ(z) ≥ ψ(z1) + [ζ(εm, z)− ζ(εm, zm)] + . . .+ [ζ(ε1, z2)− ζ(ε1, z1)].
Since the functions in the pair (φ, ψ) are only determined up to a constant, normalize ψ(z1) = 0 and define V
as the infimum of all functions ψ satisfying ψ(z) ≥ [ζ(εm, z)− ζ(εm, zm)]+ . . .+[ζ(ε1, z2)− ζ(ε1, z1)] over all
choices of (εi, zi)i=1,...,m in the support of pi and all m ≥ 0. It turns out that V
ζ(ε)+V (z) = ζ(ε, z), pi-almost
surely, so that integration over pi yields the fact that (V ζ , V ) achieves (DK) as desired. 
The quadratic case and Brenier’s Theorem. In the special case of Assumption S2, where ζ(ε, z) = z′ε, the
planner’s program (PK) writes
sup
pi∈M(Pε,Pz)
∫
z′εdpi(ε, z)
and the set Φζ becomes
Φ = {(W,V ) : W (ε) + V (z) ≥ z′ε}.
The pair (W,W ∗) ∈ Φ defined by
W ∗(z) = sup
ε
{z′ε−W (ε)},
W (ε) = sup
z
{z′ε−W ∗(z)}
achieves the minimum in the dual problem (DK). Notice that W and W ∗ are standard Fenchel-Legendre
convex conjugates of each other and that W =W ∗∗ and is hence convex.
In this case, ∇W ∗(z) = ∇zζ(ε, z) simplifies to ∇W
∗(z) = ε, which guarantees uniqueness and purity of
the optimal assignment z = ∇W (ε), where V is convex. As a corollary, ∇W is a Pε-almost surely uniquely
determined gradient of a convex function.
Theorem 8 (Brenier). Suppose Pε is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure and that Pε
and Pz have finite second order moments. Then, there exists a Pε-almost surely unique map of the form ∇W ,
where W is convex, such that
∫
ε′∇W (ε)dPε(ε) achieves the maximum in (PK) with ζ(ε, z) = z
′ε. The
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function W is the Pε-almost everywhere uniquely determined convex map such that Pε(∇W
−1(B)) = Pz(B)
for all Borel subsets B of the support of Pz. Moreover, (W,W
∗) achieves the dual program (DK).
A proof of Theorem 8 can be found in Section 2.1.5 of Villani (2003). Note that W is not only the unique
convex map that solves the optimization problem. However, ∇W is the unique gradient of a convex map
that pushes forward probability distribution Pε to Pz. Hence, identification can be achieved for a nonlinear
simultaneous equations model z = f(x, ε) without an underlying assumption about how choices z were
generated from tastes (x, ε). This is the content of Theorem 3, which is therefore seen to be a straightforward
application of Theorem 8.
6.2. Proof of results in the main text.
Proof of Lemma 1. This is a direct corollary of Lemma 3. 
Proof of Lemma 2. This is a corollary of Lemma 4, since Assumptions S2,R2 imply R3. 
Proof of Theorems 1 and 2. These are corollaries of Theorems 4 and 5, since Assumptions S2,C2 imply
S3,C3 and Assumptions S2,R2 imply R3. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Since z = h(x, ε), for any Borel set B,
P(Z ∈ B|X = x) = P(h(x, ε) ∈ B|X = x). (9)
By Theorem 8, a gradient of a convex function satisfying (9) is Pε|x-almost everywhere uniquely determined,
hence the result. 
Proof of Lemma 3. By definition of V ζ , we have
V (x, z) ≥ ζ(x, ε, z)− V ζ(x, ε). (10)
As, by definition of ζ-conjugation, V ζζ(x, z) = supε
[
ζ(x, ε, z)− V ζ(x, ε)
]
, we have
V (x, z) ≥ V ζζ(x, z), (11)
by taking supremum over ε in (10).
Let γ be an hedonic equilibrium probability distribution on X˜ × Z × Y˜ . By Assumption EC,
ζ(x, ε, z)− V (x, z) = U(x, ε, z)− p(z) = max
z∈Z
(U(x, ε, z)− p(z)) = max
z∈Z
(ζ(x, ε, z)− V (x, z)) = V ζ(x, ε)
is true γ-almost everywhere. Hence, there is equality in (10) γ-almost everywhere. Hence, for Pz|x almost
every z, and ε such that (z, ε) is in the support of γ, we have V (x, z) = ζ(x, ε, z) − V ζ(x, ε). But the right
hand side is bounded above by V ζζ(x, z) by definition, so we get V (x, z) ≤ V ζζ(x, z). Combined with (11),
this tells us V (x, z) = V ζζ(x, z), Pz|x almost everywhere. 
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Proof of Lemma 4. For an upper semi-continuous map S : Rd1 × Rd2 → R, possibly indexed by x, and
probability distributions µ on Rd1 and ν on Rd2 , possibly conditional on x, let TS(µ, ν) be the solution of
the Kantorovich problem, i.e.,
TS(µ, ν) = sup
γ∈M(µ,ν)
∫
R
d1×Rd2
S(ε, z)dγ(ε, z).
We state and prove three intermediate results in Steps 1, 2 and 3 before completing the proof of Lemma 4.
Step 1: We first show that Pz achieves
max
ν∈∆(Z)
[TU (Px˜, ν) + T−C(Py˜, ν)]. (12)
This step follows the method of proof of Proposition 3 in Carlier and Ekeland (2010). Take any probability
distribution ν ∈ ∆(Z), µ1 ∈ M(Px˜, ν) and µ2 ∈M(Py˜ , ν). By the Disintegration Theorem (see for instance
Pollard (2002), Theorem 9, page 117), there are families of conditional probabilities µz1 and µ
z
2, z ∈ Z, such
that µ1 = µ
z
1 ⊗ ν and µ2 = µ
z
2 ⊗ ν. Define the probability γ ∈ ∆(X˜ × Y˜ × Z) by∫
X˜×Y˜×Z
F (x˜, y˜, z)dγ(x˜, y˜, z) =
∫
X˜×Y˜×Z
F (x˜, y˜, z)dµz1(x˜)dµ
z
2(y˜)dν(z),
for each F ∈ C0(X˜, Y˜ , Z). By construction, the projection µ of γ on X˜ × Y˜ belongs to M(Px˜, Py˜). We
therefore have:∫
X˜×Z
U(x˜, z)dµ1(x˜, z)−
∫
Y˜×Z
C(y˜, z)dµ2(y˜, z) =
∫
X˜×Y˜×Z
[U(x˜, z)−C(y˜, z)] dγ(x˜, y˜, z)
≤
∫
X˜×Y˜×Z
sup
z∈Z
[U(x˜, z)− C(y˜, z)] dγ(x˜, y˜, z)
=
∫
X˜×Y˜
sup
z∈Z
[U(x˜, z)−C(y˜, z)] dµ(x˜, y˜).
Since ν, µ1 and µ2 are arbitrary, the latter sequence of displays shows that the value of program (12) is
smaller than or equal to the value of program (13) below.
sup
µ∈M(Px˜,Py˜)
∫
X˜×Y˜
sup
z∈Z
[U(x˜, z)−C(y˜, z)] dµ(x˜, y˜). (13)
By Assumption EC, Program (13) is attained by the projection µ¯ on X˜ × Y˜ of the equilibrium probability
distribution γ. Let µ1 and µ2 be the projections of the equilibrium probability distribution γ onto X˜ × Z
and Y˜ × Z. Now, since the value of (12) is smaller than or equal to the value of (13), and the latter is
attained by µ¯, we have (12) smaller than or equal to∫
X˜×Y˜
sup
z∈Z
[U(x˜, z)− C(y˜, z)] dµ¯(x˜, y˜)
=
∫
X˜×Z
U(x˜, z)dµ1(x˜, z) +
∫
Y˜×Z
[−C(y˜, z)] dµ2(y˜, z)
≤ sup
µ1∈M(Px˜,Pz)
∫
X˜×Z
U(x˜, z)dµ1(x˜, z) + sup
µ2∈M(Py˜,Pz)
∫
Y˜×Z
[−C(y˜, z)] dµ2(y˜, z)
which is smaller than or equal to (12), so that equality holds throughout, and Pz solves (12).
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Step 2: We then show by contradiction that for Px almost every x, Pz|x achieves
max
ν
[TU (Pε|x, ν) + T−C(Py˜|x, ν)]. (14)
Assume the conclusion is false; that is, that there is some set E ⊂ X, with Px(E) > 0 such that, for each x
in E there is some probability distribution P ′z|x on Z such that
TU (Pε|x, P
′
z|x) + T−C(Py˜|x, P
′
z|x) > TU (Pε|x, Pz|x) + T−C(Py˜|x, Pz|x).
For x /∈ E, we set P ′z|x = Pz|x. This means that for every x, P
′
z|x is defined and we have
TU (Pε|x, P
′
z|x) + T−C(Py˜|x, P
′
z|x) ≥ TU (Pε|x, Pz|x) + T−C(Py˜|x, Pz|x);
moreover, the inequality is strict on a set E of positive Px measure, so that
∫
X
[TU (Pε|x, P
′
z|x) + T−C(Py˜|x, P
′
z|x)]dPx >
∫
X
[TU (Pε|x, Pz|x) + T−C(Py˜|x, Pz|x)]dPx. (15)
We define a new probability distribution P ′z on Z by P
′
z(A) =
∫
X
P ′z|x(A)dPx(x), for each Borel set A ⊆ Z.
We claim that
TU (Px˜, P
′
z) + T−C(Py˜, P
′
z) > TU (Px˜, Pz) + T−C(Py˜ , Pz),
which contradicts the maximality of Pz in (12) established in Step 1. Let P
′
εz|x achieve the optimal trans-
portation between Pε|x and P
′
z|x; that is,
TU (Pε|x, P
′
z|x) =
∫
Rdε×Z
U(x, ε, z)dPεz|x.
Existence of such a Pεz|x is given by Theorem 6. By construction, the marginals of P
′
εz|x are Pε|x and P
′
z|x.
We define P ′x˜z on X˜ × Z for any Borel subset B ⊆ X˜ × Z by P
′
x˜z(B) :=
∫
X
P ′εz|x(Bx)dPx, where we
define Bx := {(ε, z) ∈ R
dz × Z : (x, ε, z) ∈ B}. Then, for any Borel subset A ⊆ Z,
P ′x˜z(R
dz ×X × A) =
∫
X
P ′εz|x(R
dz × A)dPx =
∫
X
P ′z|x(A)dPx = P
′
z(A).
Similarly, for any Borel subset B ⊆ Rdz ×X,
P ′x˜z(B × Z) =
∫
X
P ′εz|x(Bx × Z)dPx =
∫
X
Pε|x(Bx)dPx = Px˜(B).
The last two calculations show that Px˜ and P
′
z are the x˜ and z marginals of P
′
x˜z, respectively, and so it
follows by definition that
TU (Px˜, P
′
z) ≥
∫
X×Rdz×Z
U(x˜, z)dP ′x˜z. (16)
Similarly, we let P ′y˜z|x achieve the optimal transportation between Py˜|x and P
′
z|x and define P
′
y˜z on Y˜ × Z
by P ′y˜z =
∫
X
P ′y˜z|xdPx; a similar argument to above shows that the y˜ and z marginals of P
′
y˜z are Py˜ and P
′
z,
respectively. Therefore,
T−C(Py˜, P
′
z) ≥
∫
Y˜×Z
[−C(y˜, z)] dP ′y˜z. (17)
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Now, equations (16) and (17) yield
TU (Px˜, P
′
z) + T−C(Py˜ , P
′
z) ≥
∫
X˜×Z
U(x˜, z)dP ′x˜z +
∫
Y˜×Z
[−C(y˜, z)] dP ′y˜z
=
∫
X
[∫
Rdz×Z
U(x, ε, z)dP ′εz|x
]
dPx +
∫
X
[∫
Y˜×Z
[−C(y˜, z)] dP ′y˜z|x
]
dPx
=
∫
X
TU (Pε|x, P
′
z|x)dPx +
∫
X
[T−C(Py˜|x, P
′
z|x)dPx
>
∫
X
TU (Pε|x, Pz|x)dPx +
∫
X
[T−C(Py˜|x, Pz|x)dPx
≥
∫
X
[∫
Rdz×Z
U(x, ε, z)dPεz|x
]
dPx +
∫
X
[∫
Y˜×Z
[−C(y˜, z)] dPy˜z|x
]
dPx
=
∫
X˜×Z
U(x˜, z)dPx˜z +
∫
Y˜×Z
[−C(y˜, z)] dPy˜z
= TU (Px˜, Pz) + T−C(Py˜, Pz),
where we have used (15) in the fourth line above. This establishes the contradiction and completes the
proof.
Step 3: We finally now show that for Px almost all x, Pz|x is the unique solution of Program (14). This
step follows the method of proof of Proposition 4 in Carlier and Ekeland (2010). We know from Step 2
that Pz|x is a solution to (14). Suppose ν ∈ ∆(Z) also solves (14). Let µεz|x and µy˜z|x achieve TU (Pε|x, ν)
and T−C(Py˜|x, ν). The latter exist by Theorem 6. We therefore have
∫
Rdz×Z
U(x, ε, z)dµεz|x(ε, z|x) +
∫
Y˜×Z
[−C(y˜, z)]dµy˜z|x(y˜, z|x) = TU (Pε|x, ν) + T−C(Py˜|x, ν) = (14).
Let ϕUx denote the U -conjugate of a function ϕ on Z, as defined by ϕ
U
x (ε) := supz∈Z{U(x, ε, z) − ϕ(z)}.
Similarly, let (−ϕ)−C be the (−C)-conjugate of (−ϕ), defined as (−ϕ)−C(y˜) := supz∈Z{−C(y˜, z) + ϕ(z)}.
By definition, for any function ϕ on Z, and any (ε, y˜, z) on Rdz × Y˜ × Z, we have
ϕUx (ε) + ϕ(z) ≥ U(x, ε, z), and [−ϕ]
−C(y˜)− ϕ(z) ≥ −C(y˜, z). (18)
By Assumption EC, the price function p of the hedonic equilibrium satisfies
pUx (ε) + p(z) = U(x, ε, z), Pεz|x-a.s. and [−p]
−C(y˜)− p(z) = −C(y˜, z), Py˜z|x-almost surely. (19)
Therefore, p achieves the minimum in the program
inf
ϕ
{∫
Rdz×Z
[ϕUx (ε) + ϕ(z)]dPεz|x(ε, z|x) +
∫
Y˜×Z
[(−ϕ)−C(y˜)− ϕ(z)]dPy˜z|x(y˜, z|x)
}
= inf
ϕ
{∫
Rdz
ϕUx (ε)dPε|x(ε|x) +
∫
Z
ϕ(z)dPz|x(z|x) +
∫
Y˜
(−ϕ)−C(y˜)dPy˜|x(y˜|x)−
∫
Z
ϕ(z)dPz|x(z|x)
}
= inf
ϕ
{∫
Rdz
ϕUx (ε)dPε|x(ε|x) +
∫
Y˜
(−ϕ)−C(y˜)dPy˜|x(y˜|x)
}
. (20)
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Since p achieves (20), we have
(20) =
∫
Rdz
pUx (ε)dPε|x(ε|x) +
∫
Y˜
(−p)−C(y˜)dPy˜|x(y˜|x)
=
∫
Rdz×Z
[pUx (ε) + p(z)]dµεz|x(ε, z|x) +
∫
Y˜×Z
[(−p)−C(y˜)− p(z)]dµy˜z|x(y˜, z|x),
since µεz|x ∈M(Pε|x, ν) and µy˜z|x ∈ M(Py˜|x, ν) by construction. By the strong duality result in Theorem 3
of Carlier and Ekeland (2010), we have (14)=(20). Hence
∫
Rdz×Z
U(x, ε, z)dµεz|x(ε, z|x) +
∫
Y˜×Z
[−C(y˜, z)]dµy˜z|x(y˜, z|x)
=
∫
Rdz×Z
[pUx (ε) + p(z)]dµεz|x(ε, z|x) +
∫
Y˜×Z
[(−p)−C(y˜)− p(z)]dµy˜z|x(y˜, z|x),
which, given the inequalities (18), implies
pUx (ε) + p(z) = U(x, ε, z), µεz|x almost surely, and [−p]
−C(y˜)− p(z) = −C(y˜, z), µy˜z|x almost surely.
We therefore have pUx (ε) + p(z) = U(x, ε, z) both Pεz|x and µεz|x almost surely. The U -conjugate p
U
x of p is
locally Lipschitz by Lemma C.1 of Gangbo and McCann (1996), hence differentiable Pε|x-almost everywhere
by Rademacher’s Theorem (see for instance Villani (2009), Theorem 10.8(ii)). We can therefore apply the
Envelope Theorem to obtain the equation below.
∇pUx (ε) = ∇εU(x, ε, z) = ∇εζ(x, ε, z), both Pεz|x and µεz|x almost everywhere. (21)
By Assumption R3(1), ∇εζ(x, ε, z) is injective as a function of z. Therefore, for each ε, there is a unique z
that satisfies (21). This defines a map T : Rdz → Z, such that z = T (ε) both Pεz|x and µεz|x almost
everywhere. Since the projections of Pεz|x and µεz|x with respect to ε are the same, namely Pε|x, we
therefore have
Pεz|x = (id, T )#Pε|x = µεz|x.
The two probability distributions Pεz|x and µεz|x being equal, they must also share the same projection with
respect to z and ν = Pz|x as a result.
Armed with the results in Steps 1 to 3, we are ready to prove Lemma 4. Fix x ∈ X such that Pz|x is the
unique solution to Program (14). Let PNy˜ be a sequence of discrete probability distributions with N points
of support on Y˜ ⊆ Rdy˜ converging weakly to Py˜|x. The set of probability distributions on the compact
set Z is compact relative to the topology of weak convergence. By Assumption R3, U and C are continuous,
hence, by Theorem 5.20 of Villani (2009), the functional ν 7→ TU (Pε|x, ν) + T−C(P
N
y˜ , ν) is continuous with
respect to the topology of weak convergence. Program maxν∈∆(Z)[TU (Pε|x, ν)+T−C(P
N
y˜ , ν)], therefore, has
a solution we denote PNz .
We first show that PNz converges weakly to Pz|x. For any probability measure ν on Z, we have
TU (Pε|x, ν) + T−C(P
N
y˜ , ν) ≤ TU (Pε|x, P
N
z ) + T−C(P
N
y˜ , P
N
z ). (22)
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Since Z is compact, ∆(Z) is compact with respect to weak convergence. Hence, we can extract from
(PNz ) a convergent subsequence, which we also denote (P
N
z ), as is customary, and we call the limit P¯ .
By the stability of optimal transport (Villani (2009), Theorem 5.20), we have T−C(P
N
y˜ , ν)→ T−C(Py˜|x, ν),
TU (Pε|x, P
N
z )→ TU (Pε|x, P¯ ) and T−C(P
N
y˜ , P¯ )→ T−C(Py˜|x, P¯ ), and so passing to the limit in inequality (22)
yields
TU (Pε|x, ν) + T−C(Py˜|x, ν) ≤ TU (Pε|x, P¯ ) + T−C(Py˜|x, P¯ ).
As this holds for any probability distribution ν on Rdz , it implies that P¯ is optimal in Program (14). By
uniqueness proved in Step 3, we then have P¯ = Pz|x, as desired.
We are now ready to complete the proof of Lemma 4. Combining Steps 1 to 3 above, we know that PNz
is the marginal with respect to z of a hedonic equilibrium distribution γN on Rdz × Z × {y˜1, . . . , y˜N}, with
consumer and producer distributions Pε|x and P
N
y˜ , respectively. By Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 4(1)
applied to this hedonic equilibrium with producer type distribution PNy˜ , for each N , there is an optimal
map FN pushing P
N
z forward to Pε|x i.e., Pε|x = FN#P
N
z . For i = 1, 2, ...N , we define the subsets S
N
i ⊆ Z
by
SNi = {z ∈ Z : z ∈ argmax
w
(U(x, FN(z), w)− C(y˜i, w))};
note that SNi is the set of quality vectors that are produced by producer type y˜i. Since P
N
y˜ has finite
support {y˜1, . . . , y˜N}, P
N
z almost all z belong to some Si, i = 1, . . . , N . We then set
ENi = {z ∈ S
N
i and z /∈ S
N
j for all j < i},
for each i = 1, . . . , N , with the convention SN0 = ∅. The E
N
i are disjoint, and E
N = ∪Ni=1E
N
i has full P
N
z
measure, PNz (E
N) = 1. On each ENi , FN coincides with a map Gi, which satisfies
∇zU(x,Gi(z), z)−∇zC(y˜i, z) = 0
or
∇zU¯(x, z) +∇zζ(x,Gi(z), z)−∇zC(y˜i, z) = 0.
By Assumption R3(3) the Implicit Function Theorem, Gi is differentiable and we have
[D2zzU¯(x, z) +D
2
zzζ(x,Gi(z), z)−D
2
zzC(y˜i, z)] +D
2
zεζ(x,Gi(z), z)DGi(z) = 0
so that
DGi(z) = [D
2
zεζ(x,Gi(z), z)]
−1[D2zzU¯(x, z) +D
2
zzζ(x,Gi(z), z)−D
2
zzC(y˜i, z)].
Therefore, |DGi(z)| ≤M0M1 := C by Assumptions R2(1) and R3(3). Now, this implies that Gi is Lipschitz
with constant C, and therefore, FN restricted to E
N
i is also Lipschitz with constant C.
30 VICTOR CHERNOZHUKOV, ALFRED GALICHON, MARC HENRY AND BRENDAN PASS
Now, for any Borel A ⊂ Rdz , we can write A ∩EN = ∪Ni=1(A ∩E
N
i ). Therefore,
PNz (A) = P
N
z (A ∩ E
N) ≤ PNz (F
−1
N (FN (A ∩ E
N)))
= Pε|x(FN(A ∩E
N ))
= Pε|x(FN(∪
N
i=1(A ∩ E
N
i ))
= Pε|x(∪
N
i=1FN (A ∩ E
N
i )). (23)
Denote by |A| the Lebesgue measure of a set A in the rest of this proof. We now show the absolute
continuity of of Pz|x by contradiction. Assume not; then there is a set A with |A| = 0 but δ = Pz|x(A) > 0.
We can choose open neighbourhoods, A ⊆ Ak, with |Ak| ≤
1
k
; by weak convergence of PNz to Pz|x, we have
lim inf
N→∞
PNz (Ak) ≥ Pz|x(Ak) ≥ δ
and so for sufficiently large N , we have PNz (Ak) ≥ δ/2. On the other hand, by the Lipschitz property of FN
on ENi , we have
|FN (Ak ∩E
N
i )| ≤ C
dz |Ak ∩E
N
i |,
so that
| ∪Ni=1 FN (Ak ∩E
N
i )| ≤ C
dz
N∑
i=1
|Ak ∩E
N
i | = C
dz |Ak ∩E
N | ≤ Cdz |Ak| ≤
Cdz
k
.
Now, Pε|x is absolutely continuous, so that Pε|x(∪
N
i=1FN (Ak ∩E
N
i ))→ 0 as k →∞ (because | ∪
N
i=1 FN (Ak ∩
ENi )| → 0 as k →∞). On the other hand, by (23), Pε|x(∪
N
i=1FN (Ak ∩E
N
i )) ≥ P
N
z (Ak) ≥
δ
2
for all k, which
is a contradiction, completing the proof. 
Proof of Theorems 4 and 5. Step 1: identification of inverse demand. For a fixed observable type x, assume
that the types x˜0 := (x, ε0) and x˜1 := (x, ε1) both choose the same good, z¯ ∈ Z, from producers y˜0 and y˜1,
respectively.
We want to prove that this implies the unobservable types are also the same; that is, that ε0 = ε1. This
property is equivalent to having a map from the good qualities Z to the unobservable types, for each fixed
observable type.
Note that z¯ must maximize the joint surplus for both ε0 and ε1. That is, setting
S(x, ε, y˜) = sup
z∈Z
[U¯(x, z) + ζ(x, ε, z)− C(y˜, z)]
we have,
S(x, ε0, y˜0) = U¯(x, z¯) + ζ(x, ε0, z¯)− C(y˜0, z¯) (24)
and
S(x, ε1, y˜1) = U¯(x, z¯) + ζ(x, ε1, z¯)− C(y˜1, z¯). (25)
IDENTIFYING MULTI-ATTRIBUTE HEDONIC MODELS 31
By Assumption EC, we can apply Lemma 1 of Chiappori, McCann, and Nesheim (2010), so that the pair
of indirect utilities (V,W ), where
V (x˜) = sup
z∈Z
(U(x˜, z)− p(z))
W (y˜) = sup
z∈Z
(p(z)− C(y˜, z)) ,
achieve the dual (DK) of the optimal transportation problem
sup
pi∈M(Px˜,Py˜)
∫
S(x˜, y˜)dpi(x˜, y˜),
with solution pi. This implies, from Theorem 7, that for pi-almost all pairs (x˜0, y˜0) and (x˜1, y˜1),
V (x˜0) +W (y˜0) = S(x˜0, y˜0),
V (x˜1) +W (y˜1) = S(x˜1, y˜1),
V (x˜0) +W (y˜1) ≥ S(x˜0, y˜1),
V (x˜1) +W (y˜0) ≥ S(x˜1, y˜0).
We therefore deduce the condition (called the 2-monotonicity condition):
S(x, ε0, y˜0) + S(x, ε1, y˜1) ≥ S(x, ε1, y˜0) + S(x, ε0, y˜1),
recalling that x˜0 = (x, ε0) and x˜1 = (x, ε1). Now, by definition of S as the maximized surplus, we have
S(x, ε1, y˜0) ≥ U¯(x, z¯) + ζ(x, ε1, z¯)− C(y˜0, z¯) (26)
and
S(x, ε0, y˜1) ≥ U¯(x, z¯) + ζ(x, ε0, z¯)− C(y˜1, z¯). (27)
Inserting this, as well as (24) and (25) into the 2-monotonicity inequality yields
U¯(x, z¯) + ζ(x, ε0, z¯)−C(y˜0, z¯) + U¯(x, z¯) + ζ(x, ε1, z¯)− C(y˜1, z¯)
≥ S(x, ε1, y˜0) + S(x, ε0, y˜1)
≥ U¯(x, z¯) + ζ(x, ε1, z¯)− C(y˜0, z¯) + U¯(x, z¯) + ζ(x, ε0, z¯)− C(y˜1, z¯).
But the left and right hand sides of the preceding string of inequalities are identical, so we must have equality
throughout. In particular, we must have equality in (26) and (27). Equality in (26), for example, means
that z¯ maximizes z 7→ U¯(x, z)+ ζ(x, ε1, z)−C(y˜0, z), and so, as z¯ is in the interior of Z by Assumption EC,
we have
∇zζ(x, ε1, z¯) = ∇zC(y˜0, z¯)−∇zU¯(x, z¯). (28)
Since z¯ also maximizes z 7→ U¯(x, z) + ζ(x, ε0, z)−C(y˜0, z), we also have
∇zζ(x, ε0, z¯) = ∇zC(y˜0, z¯)−∇zU¯(x, z¯). (29)
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Equations (28) and (29) then imply
∇zζ(x, ε1, z¯) = ∇zζ(x, ε0, z¯)
and Assumption S3 implies ε1 = ε0.
Step 2: Differentiability of V in z. In this step, we work under Assumptions EC, H, R1, S3 and C3. The
proof under Assumptions EC, H, S3 and R3 is presented in Step 2 alternative below. The method of proof
of Step 2 is to prove that the subdifferential at each z0 is a singleton, which is equivalent to differentiability
at z0.
Definition 5 (Subdifferential). The subdifferential ∂ψ(x0) of a function ψ : R
d → R∪ {+∞} at x0 ∈ R
d is
the set of vectors p ∈ Rd, called subgradients, such that ψ(x)− ψ(x0) ≥ p
′(x− x0) + o(‖x− x0‖).
Remark 13. The subdifferential is always closed and convex. If f is continuous, its subdifferential is also
bounded.
From Assumption C3, V (x, z) is ζ-convex, and hence locally semiconvex, by Proposition C.2 in Gangbo
and McCann (1996). We recall the definition of local semiconvexity from the latter paper.
Definition 6 (Local semiconvexity). A function ψ : Rd → R∪{+∞} is called locally semiconvex at x0 ∈ R
d
if there is a scalar λ > 0 such that ψ(x) + λ‖x‖2 is convex on some open ball centered at x0.
Since the term λ‖x‖2 in the definition of local semiconvexity simply shifts the subdifferential by 2λx,
we can extend Theorem 25.6 in Rockafellar (1970) to locally semiconvex functions and obtain the following
lemma.
Lemma 5. Let ψ : Rd → R∪{+∞} be a locally semiconvex function, and suppose that q ∈ Rd is an extremal
point in the subdifferential ∂ψ(x0) of ψ at x0. Then there exists a sequence xn converging to x0, such that ψ
is differentiable at each xn and the gradient ∇ψ(xn) converges to q.
Now, Step 1 shows that for each fixed z, the set
{ε ∈ Rdz : V (x, z) + V ζ(x, ε) = ζ(x, ε, z)} := {f(z)} (30)
is a singleton. We claim that this means V is differentiable with respect to z everywhere. Fix a point z0. We
will prove that the subdifferential ∂zV (x, z0) contains only one extremal point (for a definition, see Rockafellar
(1970), Section 18). This will yield the desired result. Indeed, the subdifferential of V is closed and convex
by Remark 13. By Assumption C3, V is ζ-convex, hence continuous, by the combination of Propositions C.2
and C.6(i) in Gangbo and McCann (1996). Hence, still by Remark 13, the subdifferential is also bounded.
Hence, it is equal to the convex hull of its extreme points (see Rockafellar (1970), Theorem 18.5). The
subdifferential of V at z0 must therefore be a singleton, and V must be differentiable at z0 (Theorem 25.1
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in Rockafellar (1970) can be easily extended to locally semiconvex functions). Let q be any extremal point
in ∂zV (x, z0). Let zn be a sequence satisfying the conclusion in Lemma 5. Now, as V is differentiable at
each point zn, we have the envelope condition
∇Vz(x, zn) = ∇zζ(x, εn, zn) (31)
where εn = f(zn) is the unique point giving equality in (30).
As the sequence ∇zζ(x, εn, zn) converges, the growth condition in Assumption R3 implies that the εn
remain in a bounded set. We can therefore pass to a convergent subsequence εn → ε0. By continuity of ∇zζ,
we can pass to the limit in (31) and, recalling that the left hand side tends to q, we obtain q = ∇zζ(x, ε0, z0).
Now, by definition of εn, we have the equality V (x, zn) + V
ζ(x, εn) = ζ(x, εn, zn). By Assumption C3, V
and V ζ are ζ-convex, hence continuous, by the combination of Propositions C.2 and C.6(i) in Gangbo and
McCann (1996). Hence, we can pass to the limit to obtain V (x, z0) + V
ζ(x, ε0) = ζ(x, ε0, z0). But this
means ε0 = f(z0), and so q = ∇zζ(x, ε0, z0) = ∇zζ(x, f(z0), z0) is uniquely determined by z0. This means
that the subdifferential can only have one extremal point, completing the proof of differentiability of V .
Step 2 alternative: We now work under Assumptions EC, H, S3 and R3. By Lemma 3, we know that
for each x, V (x, z) = V ζζ(x, z), Pz|x almost everywhere, and Pz|x is absolutely continuous with respect
to Lebesgue measure, by Lemma 4. We will prove that V is therefore approximately differentiable Pz|x
almost everywhere, with ∇ap,zV (x, z) = ∇zV
ζζ(x, z), where ∇ap,zV (x, z) denotes the approximate gradient
of V (x, z) with respect to z.
Definition 7 (Approximate differentiability). If we have
lim
r↓0
|Br(x) ∩E|
|Br(x)|
= 1,
where |B| is Lebesgue measure of B, Br(x) is an open ball of radius r centered at x, and E ⊆ R
d is a
measurable set, x is called density point of E. Let x0 be a density point of a measurable set E ⊆ R
d and
let f : E → R be a measurable map. If there is a linear map A : Rd → R such that, for each η > 0, x0 is a
density point of {
x ∈ E : −η ≤
f(x)− f(x0)− A(x− x0)
‖x− x0‖
≤ η
}
,
then f is said to be approximately differentiable at x0, and A is called the approximate gradient of f at x0.
Remark 14. The approximate differential is uniquely defined, as shown below Definition 10.2 page 218 of
Villani (2009).
By Lemma 3, we have V = V ζζ , Pz|x almost everywhere. Moreover, as a ζ conjugate, V
ζζ is locally
Lipschitz by Lemma C.1 of Gangbo and McCann (1996), hence differentiable Pz|x-almost everywhere by
Rademacher’s Theorem (see for instance Villani (2009), Theorem 10.8(ii)). Hence, there exists a set S of
full Pz|x measure such that, for each z0 ∈ S,
34 VICTOR CHERNOZHUKOV, ALFRED GALICHON, MARC HENRY AND BRENDAN PASS
(1) V ζζ(x, z) is differentiable with respect to z at z0.
(2) V (x, z0) = V
ζζ(x, z0).
By Lebesgue’s density theorem (still denoting Lebesgue measure of B by |B|),
lim
r↓0
|S ∩Br(z)|
|Br(z)|
= 1
for Lebesgue almost every z ∈ Z, hence also for Pz|x almost every z, by the absolute continuity of Pz|x.
Since S has Pz|x measure 1, the set S¯ of density points of S,
S¯ =
{
z ∈ S : lim
r↓0
|S ∩ Br(z)|
|Br(z)|
= 1
}
,
therefore has Pz|x measure 1. Take any density point z0 of S, i.e., z0 ∈ S¯. Fix η > 0. Since z0 ∈ S¯ ⊆ S, V
ζζ
is differentiable at z0. Hence there is r > 0 such that for all z ∈ Br(z0),
−η ≤
V ζζ(z)− V ζζ(z0)−∇zV
ζζ(z0) · (z − z0)
‖z − z0‖
≤ η.
Since V ζζ = V on S, for all z ∈ Br(z0) ∩ S, we have
−η ≤
V (z)− V (z0)−∇zV
ζζ(z0) · (z − z0)
‖z − z0‖
≤ η.
Therefore Br(z0) ∩ S = Br(z0) ∩ S˜, where
S˜ :=
{
z ∈ S : −η ≤
V (z)− V (z0)−∇zV
ζζ(z0) · (z − z0)
‖z − z0‖
≤ η
}
.
As z0 is a density point of S,
lim
r↓0
|S˜ ∩ Br(z0)|
|Br(z0)|
= lim
r↓0
|S ∩Br(z0)|
|Br(z0)|
= 1,
so that z0 is also a density point of S˜, which means, by definition, that V is approximately differentiable
at z0, and that its approximate gradient is ∇ap,zV (x, z0) = ∇zV
ζζ(x, z0). The latter is true for any z0 ∈ S¯
and S¯ has Pz|x measure 1. Hence, V is approximately differentiable Pz|x almost everywhere.
Step 3: Since by Step 2 or Step 2 alternative, V (x, z) is approximately differentiable Pz|x almost surely,
and since U¯(x, z) is differentiable by assumption, p(z) = V (x, z) − U¯(x, z) is also approximately differen-
tiable Pz|x almost surely. Since, by Step 1, the inverse demand function ε(x, z) is uniquely determined, the
first order condition ∇zζ(x, ε(x, z), z) = ∇app(z)−∇zU¯(x, z) identifies ∇zU¯(x, z), Pz|x almost everywhere,
as required. 
Proof of Theorem 4(2). In Part (1), we have shown uniqueness (up to location) of the pair (V, V ζ) such
that V (x, z) + V ζ(x, ε) = ζ(x, ε, z), pi-almost surely. By Theorem 7, this implies that (V, V ζ) is the unique
(up to location) pair of ζ-conjugates that solves the dual Kantorovitch problem as required.
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